The results
of the 2026 University Academic Staff Union (UASU) national elections are out. Seats
were retained by Dr Constantine Wasonga (secretary general), Wakili Grace
Nyongesa (chairperson), Cyprian Ombati (vice chairperson), Dr Janepha Kumba
(treasurer), Don Weldon Keter (assistant national treasurer) and Dr Jane
Michael (trustee).
The new entrants are Dr Grace Kibue (deputy secretary general), Eng Jacob Musembi (organising secretary) Prof Josiah Odalo and Dr Florence
Guantai (Trustees).
Of all these, only Eng Musembi was elected from the camp
opposed to the Wasonga-Nyongesa axis, christened the “Liberty Team”.
UASU is
not just another labour body. It is the institutional voice of university
lecturers, researchers and scholars working in a higher education system
battered by chronic underfunding, delayed salaries, unimplemented collective
bargaining agreements, governance instability and a state that increasingly
appears to want world-class universities on a bargain-basement budget.
To lead
UASU, therefore, is not merely to occupy office. It is to inherit a frontline
political role in the battle over the future of public university education in
Kenya.
Now, to
understand the significance of the result, one must begin with the fact that
the 2026 UASU elections were shaped by a crisis of succession, legitimacy and
constitutional control.
For
months, UASU had been wrestling with the fallout of legal and internal disputes
over constitutional amendments, including the politically explosive issue of
term limits for top officials.
Once the courts effectively blocked attempts to
alter the constitutional order under which the union would vote, the election stopped being a routine transition exercise and turned into something much
bigger: a battle over whether the outgoing power centre would retain influence
or whether an anti-establishment coalition would break it.
That is
why the UASU vote was so closely watched in union circles. It was not simply
about filling offices. It was about answering a far more strategic question:
Could
the current leadership architecture survive the term-limit storm by
reorganising itself around loyalists, allies and carefully chosen successors—or
would the crisis create enough momentum for an anti-establishment wave? The
answer is now clear. The establishment survived.
Publicly,
the campaigns may have sounded like they were about service, welfare and the
future of lecturers. And of course, they were partly about those things. But
internally, the contest was sharper. It revolved around two broad camps.
The
Wasonga-Nyongesa establishment axis: This
was the continuity bloc — the network of branch delegates, national office
loyalists, experienced operatives and incumbent-aligned actors who believed the
union should not be handed over to an untested coalition at a time of sectoral
crisis.
Its
central argument was straightforward: UASU is in the middle of a bruising
confrontation with the state over funding, salaries, CBAs and the general
erosion of public university education.
In such a moment, the union requires
institutional memory, negotiating experience, and a leadership that already
understands the bureaucracy of labour relations, state engagement and branch
management.
But
behind that public argument was a more hard-edged political calculation: if the
establishment lost this election, it risked not only losing office but also
losing the ability to shape the narrative of its own legacy.
The
alliance between Nyongesa at the chairperson level and Wasonga at the secretariat
level is what gave this bloc its backbone.
The chairperson’s office offers
political legitimacy and public face; the secretary general’s office is the
union’s operational engine room. Retaining both effectively means keeping the
union’s symbolic and administrative centres within the same broad camp.
The anti-establishment
insurgency: On the other side was a
loser but emotionally potent coalition of delegates and branch actors who
believed UASU needed a reset.
This camp drew energy from several grievances: that
the union had become too concentrated around a familiar leadership circle; that
constitutional controversies had damaged UASU’s moral standing; that branches
were often treated as voting reservoirs rather than real centres of power; and
that members had not felt sufficient material benefit from the union’s loud
national posture on welfare matters.
Its
weakness, however, appears to have been organisational. Reformist sentiment may
have been real, but sentiment alone does not win delegate elections.
To defeat
an entrenched union establishment, one needs coherent slates, branch
discipline, national coordination, and a compelling alternative centre of
gravity. There is little evidence that the anti-establishment side managed to
build that kind of machine at the national level.
The Wasonga-Nyongesa
UASU leadership has won control, but not immunity. This is the central point.
The new UASU team has captured the top offices. It has not captured peace. Nor
has it captured patience.
The same delegates who have retained the
establishment will be watching closely to see whether the victory produces
results or simply reproduces old habits under refreshed packaging.
The Wasonga-Nyongesa
axis must read the result more intelligently: as a conditional mandate, it
should stabilise the union, restore trust, broaden inclusion, and deliver
tangible gains for dons.