MAINA: Global energy shock deepens need for Kenya’s strategic neutrality

As an import-dependent country that sources nearly 90 per cent of its wheat and all of its refined petroleum products from international markets, Kenya cannot remain a passive bystander to the escalating conflict in the Middle East.

In response, the government has articulated a multi‑pronged strategy centred on strategic neutrality, proactive energy diplomacy and accelerated regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area.

At the core of Kenya’s foreign policy posture is a reaffirmed commitment to non‑alignment. This stance was recently tested when the Iranian Embassy in Nairobi suggested that Kenya was leaning toward the United States and Israel.

In a clear rebuttal, Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing’oei stated, “Kenya remains non‑aligned in the conflict” and that the country’s priorities are “energy security, trade and the safety of our citizens in the Gulf”. This neutrality is not passivity; it is a deliberate strategy to preserve diplomatic flexibility.

By maintaining constructive relations with Western powers, Gulf monarchies, China and even Iran, Kenya can negotiate for essential goods, such as fertiliser and fuel, without being entangled in external rivalries that could carry economic penalties.

According to the International Energy Agency, the current disruption is the largest in oil market history, with roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude and refined products no longer flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.

For Kenya, which imports every drop of its refined fuel, the impact is direct. President William Ruto has acknowledged the pressure and pointed to the government's fuel procurement arrangement as a critical buffer, noting that “measures are in place to moderate adverse effects and ensure adequate supply.”

Beyond short-term procurement, the Ministry of Energy is pursuing a three-pronged strategy: expanding strategic fuel reserves beyond the current 90-day cover, diversifying supply sources to reduce overreliance on Gulf refiners, and accelerating investments in renewable energy to lower long-term exposure to oil price volatility.

Each price spike, officials argue, demonstrates that Kenya’s energy system remains an imported vulnerability, and structural change is necessary rather than episodic crisis management.

Agriculture is particularly exposed because up to 30 per cent of global fertiliser trade normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The Persian Gulf region accounts for 36 per cent of global urea exports, with Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as leading suppliers. Higher fertiliser prices directly translate into reduced application rates, lower crop yields and more expensive food.

The government has reassured farmers that current fertiliser stocks are sufficient for the rainy season through September. At the same time, it is actively seeking alternative supply routes, including potential arrangements with North African producers and increased domestic blending capacity.

Lessons from the 2022 price spike, as highlighted by the International Food Policy Research Institute, show that blanket fertiliser subsidies distort markets and strain public finances; Kenya therefore requires a combination of targeted support for smallholders and long‑term investment in soil health and efficient fertiliser use.

Hundreds of thousands of Kenyan families depend on remittances from relatives working in Gulf countries. Last year, these flows exceeded $5 billion, helping stabilise the shilling and support household consumption.

The conflict threatens this lifeline through potential job losses, rising living costs in the Gulf, and possible restrictions on foreign workers. Kenya’s diplomatic missions across the region have issued security advisories, registered citizens and established emergency communication channels. However, consular protection alone is insufficient.

The broader strategy includes deepening bilateral labour agreements, diversifying destination countries for Kenyan workers, and building domestic economic resilience to reduce long‑term dependency on remittances.

Despite the challenges, there are opportunities. The Ports of Mombasa and Lamu have recorded increased activity, with Lamu handling more than 4,000 high‑value vehicles for transshipment to Gulf markets. While the Red Sea corridor has seen shipping volumes fall by as much as 40 per cent, forcing vessels onto longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, Kenya can position itself as a reliable regional transshipment hub.

By improving port efficiency, reducing clearance times and offering a stable alternative to congested Gulf ports, Kenya can capture new business. Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi emphasised this point at an event marking Ethiopia’s Battle of Adwa anniversary:

“We must find alternative arrangements as we observe trends where global supply chains are disrupted. For Africa, there is now an even more urgent need to actualise the African Continental Free Trade Area.”

The current crisis has renewed urgency around continental integration. The AfCFTA represents a structural hedge against global supply chain volatility.

Mudavadi has made deeper intra‑African trade a centerpiece of his diplomatic messaging, arguing that reducing exposure to distant maritime chokepoints requires accelerating regional energy integration, including pipeline connections and power pool arrangements, and strengthening the East African Community, which already represents a market of more than 300 million people.

While trade within the bloc continues to grow, non‑tariff barriers, infrastructure gaps and payment system inefficiencies remain obstacles that must be addressed to build shared resilience.

Kenya’s response to the Middle East‑driven supply chain crisis is not reactive but strategic. The government has reaffirmed that it will not be drawn into great‑power rivalries, will not abandon its citizens in the Gulf, and will not wait for the next crisis to build resilience.

Critics may argue that neutrality is a luxury in a polarised world, but Kenya’s interests are too diverse to fit neatly into any single alignment. The United States provides security cooperation; China offers infrastructure investment; Gulf states supply energy, jobs and capital; and Iran remains a potential source of fertiliser and crude.

Strategic neutrality, as articulated by Kenyan officials, means keeping national interests, economic resilience, diaspora protection and diplomatic flexibility at the forefront.

The writer is a senior research fellow at Global Centre for Policy and Strategy, a Nairobi-based think tank