Guard loses appeal after being knocked by vehicle while manning gate
Court dismisses gatekeeper’s bid for higher damages following Ruaka car crash
by CATHY WAMAITHA
Audio By Vocalize
The High Court at Kiambu has dismissed an appeal challenging
a Sh500,000 general damages award to a guard who was knocked down by a vehicle
while manning a gate at his workplace.
In his judgment, Justice Kennedy Kandet affirmed the
decision of the trial court in the case arising from a road traffic accident on
January 8, 2023 along the Ruaka-Ndenderu Road.
Douglas Ndete Akula, the appellant, had been employed as a
gatekeeper at Ruaka Cytonn Limited when a motor vehicle struck him.
“The subject motor vehicle was negligently, recklessly and
carelessly driven and/or controlled by the defendants, their servant, agent and/or
driver, causing it to knock down the appellant, Douglas Ndete Akula, who was
then manning a gate at his place of work, Ruaka Cytonn Limited. As a result of
the collision, the appellant sustained serious bodily injuries and suffered
loss and damage,” court records show.
He sustained a blunt head injury, facial lacerations, a
fractured left clavicle, bruises on both limbs, a pelvic blunt injury and an
open chest wound among others.
The trial court had awarded Akula Sh500,000 in general
damages, Sh163,500 in special damages and costs.
Liability was apportioned at 80 per cent against the
respondents, David Muthama and Ann Wairimu Kabutu, who were the registered
owner and driver of the vehicle.
Dissatisfied, the appellant moved to the High Court arguing
that the award was low.
The appellant’s counsel submitted that the trial magistrate
had failed to evaluate the evidence properly and had ignored comparable
authorities.
He sought to have the judgment set aside and reassessed, or
in the alternative that the High Court delivers a fresh judgment awarding
higher general damages.
Citing cases where Sh650,000 and Sh800,000 had been upheld
for similar injuries including clavicle fractures, the appellant argued that
the Sh500,000 award was “manifestly low”.
His counsel urged the court to interfere, relying on the
principle that an appellate court may disturb an award that is based on wrong
principles or is so low as to represent an erroneous estimate.
The respondents countered that the award was fair and reasonable.
Their counsel submitted that “the award of damages is a
matter within the discretion of the trial court”.
They contended that no basis had been established “to
warrant interference with the exercise of that discretion”.
They noted that the medical report by Dr Namu Kimunguyi had
classified the injuries as soft tissue injuries of moderate severity, with an
expectation of complete recovery and no permanent incapacity.
Justice Kennedy Kandet observed that prior medical
examinations indicated Akula was in a fair general condition with healed
bruises and that his fractures and blunt trauma ultimately constituted soft
tissue injuries of moderate severity without any permanent disability.
“Comparable awards serve only as a guide and each case must
be determined on its own facts. In the present case, the absence of permanent
incapacity and the favourable prognosis justified a more moderate award,” the
judge said.
In dismissing the appeal, the judge held that the trial
court had not erred.
“In my view, having considered the material placed before me
and the cited authorities and going by the injuries sustained by the appellant,
I am not persuaded that the award of Sh500,000 is inordinately low so as to
attract intervention by this court.”
He quoted the Court of Appeal’s guidance that “unless an
award is inordinately low or high, an appellate court should be slow to
interfere with an award of damages by the trial court”.
He emphasised the trial judge “has the advantage of seeing
the victim of the accident assess the impact of the injuries, even as they
consider the medical reports”.
He concluded that the trial court’s award fell within a
reasonable range and dismissed the appeal in its entirety. The award of special
damages was not contested.
The appellant would bear the costs of this appeal.