The International Criminal Court has formally closed its long-running investigation into Kenya’s 2007–08 post-election violence.

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) said it finished the country’s inquiry on November 27, 2023, but it has not closed every file.

Two individuals charged with offences against the administration of justice however remain at large and are still being pursued by the Court.

“On November 27, 2023, the Office announced its decision to conclude the investigation in this situation. Following this decision, the Office’s activities have been limited to monitoring developments and tracking two suspects at large,” a report by ICC read.

“They are the subject of warrants of arrest for alleged offences against the administration of justice pursuant to Article 70 of the Rome Statute, consisting of corrupting or attempting to corruptly influence ICC witnesses.”

That narrow remaining focus, closure of the broad investigation while pursuing fugitives accused of witness interference, leaves unresolved legal, political and moral questions for victims, for Kenya’s public memory of the violence, and for the broader idea of accountability.

This explainer walks through what has been decided and what remains open, the historic record of the ICC’s involvement in Kenya, the narrow but consequential meaning of a continuing “hunt for fugitives,” and the likely consequences for victims, domestic justice efforts and political stability.

What exactly closed, and what remains open

The closure the Court refers to is the Office of the Prosecutor’s formal ending of active investigations into the broader Kenya situation.

According to the ICC’s public record, the prosecutor concluded investigative work on the Kenya situation a little over two years ago, drawing a line under the sustained inquiries that began after the 2007–08 violence.

That formal conclusion does not erase the Court’s existing case docket. It simply signals that the OTP is no longer carrying out broad investigatory operations in Kenya beyond limited follow-up work.

At the same time, the ICC has confirmed it continues to seek the arrest and transfer of two named individuals who are alleged to have committed offences against the administration of justice.

These are essentially, offences related to corruptly influencing or attempting to influence ICC witnesses under Article 70 of the Rome Statute.

The active pursuit of the two fugitives is the main thread of ICC business that continues to tie the Court to Kenya.

The historic record in brief

A short timeline helps explain why the end of investigation matters.

• 2007–08: Post-election violence. Following Kenya’s disputed December 2007 presidential election, violence claimed over 1,000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands. Large-scale human rights abuses and attacks were documented and became the basis for later international scrutiny.

The elections took place on December 27, and three days later, then incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of the PNU was declared the winner.

The victory was greatly opposed by the late Raila Odinga of the ODM amidst allegations of election fraud on both sides triggering outbreaks of violence.

On February 5, 2008, then International Criminal Court Prosecutor ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said his office has begun a preliminary examination of the post-election violence in Kenya.

On February 28, a mediation team, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, oversaw the signing of a power-sharing agreement called the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which established a coalition government with Kibaki as president and Raila as prime minister.

It also set up the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), which later became known as the Waki Commission after its chair, Judge Philip Waki.

On October 15, 2008, the Waki Commission submitted its report and recommendations to the government of Kenya; recommendations included the establishment of a special tribunal of national and international judges to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence.

The report also stated that if the tribunal is not set up within six months, information collected by the Waki Commission would be passed to the ICC, including a sealed envelope of names of those suspected to be most responsible for the violence.

• 2010s: ICC involvement. The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor opened a proprio motu investigation into the situation in the country in March 2010, meaning the prosecutor initiated the inquiry on their own authority rather than via a state referral.

The cases that followed were intended to address alleged crimes against humanity linked to the post-election violence.

On March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued its majority decision (2-1) that there was a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into the situation in relation to crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Court committed between June 1, 2005 and November 26, 2009.

On December 15, the ICC Prosecutor requested the issuance of ‘summonses to appear’ for six people in the court’s Kenya investigation.

On April 7, 2011, the first three defendants made their initial appearance before the Court in The Hague, and on the next day, the other three did so too.

In September and October, confirmation of charges hearing, for all defendants, begun and concluded.

Some cases proceeded to pre-trial and trial phases, but the Court’s work was repeatedly affected by witness problems and by political controversy inside Kenya and beyond.

• 2013–2016: Trials and withdrawals. One of the cases saw charges eventually withdrawn in 2014, and as another encountered major setbacks as key prosecution witnesses were withdrawn amid allegations of interference.

The process left many Kenyans and observers sceptical about whether the ICC could secure full trials for the main political figures implicated.

At the time, parallel domestic cases in Kenya’s High Court (IDP and SGBV petitions) sought accountability for victims outside the ICC framework.

• 2013–2021 and beyond: Article 70 proceedings. The Court also brought separate proceedings under Article 70, offences against the administration of justice, where individuals were accused of tampering with or corruptly influencing witnesses.

Some people were prosecuted at the ICC for those Article 70 offences; others remained the subject of warrants.

It is these Article 70 matters, not fresh crimes against humanity prosecutions, that account for the fugitives the Court continues to pursue.

That history shows the ICC’s Kenya involvement was never limited to a neat set of courtroom dramas.

Investigation, prosecution and the Court’s work to protect or recover witnesses stretched over years and intersected with Kenyan domestic politics in ways that complicated both justice and reconciliation.

What does ‘hunt for fugitives’ mean in practice

When the ICC says it is pursuing fugitives, that pursuit is a combination of legal, diplomatic and operational activity.

Practically speaking it can include maintaining arrest warrants on the ICC website and in its case records, which gives the warrants international legal force and signals to states and international partners to act on any credible information that turns up.

According to the Court, it means engaging in tracking, information-sharing and cooperation requests with states and law-enforcement partners.

The ICC itself does not have a police force or powers to arrest; it depends on state cooperation to locate, arrest and surrender suspects to The Hague.

To that end the Court conducts outreach with member states and can request assistance where it believes suspects are present.

The November 2025 reporting around the Kenya situation notes the Court’s continued monitoring and the narrow focus on fugitives and witness-protection issues.

The hunt also means bringing and maintaining legal proceedings at the Court where arrest has not yet occurred.

A pending warrant or an unexecuted arrest request means that the case remains formally open at the pre-trial or article-70 stage until that person is surrendered or otherwise accounted for.

The docket continues to require judicial oversight even if the scope of active investigating has been reduced.

Because the ICC relies on states for arrests, the ‘hunt’ often becomes a diplomatic test. If a fugitive is believed to be inside the territory of a state that is unwilling or unable to cooperate, the chance of arrest is slim.

Conversely, if the person lives openly or seeks to travel internationally, an arrest anywhere in the world could lead to transfer to The Hague.

Why the remaining fugitives matter for justice

The continuing pursuit of two alleged offenders for witness interference is not a technicality. It speaks to core issues of the ICC’s credibility, witness protection and the integrity of any prior or future prosecutions.

There are three interlinked reasons the fugitives matter, where witness protection is foundational. The Article 70 allegations are not peripheral matters.

They relate to serious attempts to undermine the Court’s ability to protect and rely on witness testimony.

The ICC has repeatedly said that preserving the integrity of testimony is crucial to the administration of international justice.

If people can interfere with witnesses with impunity, it erodes the ability to hold perpetrators of grave crimes to account.

Additionally, a legal closure is incomplete without accountability. For victims and the public, a general “closure” of investigation can feel hollow if individuals who allegedly obstructed justice are not apprehended.

The continuing warrants signal that the ICC considers those acts serious enough to warrant ongoing pursuit even after the broader investigation ended

Seeking to prosecute the fugitives shapes public narrative and deterrence. The fact the ICC still seeks fugitives underlines that tampering with witnesses has consequences beyond domestic politics.

For future cases, the ICC’s pursuit, and its success or failure, will influence whether potential obstructers perceive risk in trying to corrupt testimony. The outcome will therefore affect deterrence and the credibility of international fact-finding.

What closure means for victims and public memory

For victims of the 2007–08 violence, closure of the ICC investigation is double-edged.

On one hand, the end of investigation removes the prospect of further international trials for many of the original allegations of crimes against humanity.

For victims who sought trials of the principal political leaders believed responsible, that is a profound disappointment.

Many survivors publicly called for accountability and saw the ICC as a last-resort avenue when they lacked faith in national prosecutions.

The practical effect of closure means those hopes must now depend largely on domestic mechanisms or other forms of redress.

Speaking with JfJ Justice in 2023 back when investigations were closed, Jacqueline Mutere, a survivor of sexual violence from the post-election violence and co-founder of Grace Agenda said the ICC decision was deeply disappointing and that the court should revisit its mandate.

“The ICC represented accountability where local mechanisms could not work. The decision is a mockery of the survivors and the process – and it is literally dancing on the graves of lost loved ones. Why wait until now? What has changed? Was this a cold case being revived for an opportune moment? What then is justice? This is pure impunity!” Ms. Mutere said.

On the other hand, the ICC’s sustained involvement has already produced a record: documents, witness statements, judicial decisions and a voluminous public record that underpin historical memory.

Even where trials did not end in convictions of the highest-profile figures, the Court’s investigations created an archival and judicial repository that scholars, journalists and victims can use to reconstruct events.

That record plays a role in truth-telling and public memory, but it is not a substitute for verdicts and reparations.

The Trust Fund for Victims and domestic reparations mechanisms have an important role to play in filling the gap, but funding, political will and legal frameworks determine whether victims receive meaningful measures of redress.

In short, closure at the ICC does not erase the harms but it narrows the routes through which victims can seek formal international justice.

What it means for domestic prosecutions and complementarity

The Rome Statute is based on complementarity: the ICC acts when national jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. With the ICC stepping back from active investigation, the spotlight turns to Kenya’s domestic legal system.

If Kenya chooses to pursue credible, independent prosecutions for serious crimes from 2007–08, that would fulfil the complementarity model and could provide a path to accountability.

But the record shows domestic prosecutions for the post-election violence were politically fraught and uneven.

Kenyan courts have handled some cases, but not at the scale or with the impartiality victims and international observers hoped for during the ICC era.

The judiciary’s capacity, political constraints and the passage of time complicate any large-scale domestic reckoning.

Where domestic prosecutions do not materialize, the ICC’s closure could create an accountability vacuum.

That vacuum can retraumatise victims and entrench narratives of impunity. Conversely, national truth-telling, commemorations, institutional reforms and reparations could mitigate the sense of abandonment even without criminal convictions.

Those non-judicial measures require political will, resources and civil society pressure.

Political stability and the court’s legacy

The ICC’s Kenyan chapter was never only legal. It was political from the start.

The involvement of major political figures, some of whom later held or now hold the highest offices, made the Court a lightning rod for accusations of bias and prompted robust domestic resistance to cooperation at times.

Closure of the investigation removes a recurring flashpoint for international diplomatic tension, but it does not eliminate the political narratives the ICC cases fed into.

For some politicians, the end of ICC activity is a political reprieve. For others, particularly victims and opposition voices, it signals unfulfilled justice.

How those perceptions translate into political behavior, whether they reduce tensions or fuel grievance politics, depends on how the Kenyan state and civil society handle memory, reparations and institutional reforms.

What would justice look like now, realistically?

Given the current situation, realistic justice outcomes include the arrest, surrender and possible trial of the two Article 70 fugitives. If states cooperate and the fugitives are transferred, those proceedings would deal directly with witness interference and would reaffirm the ICC’s interest in protecting witnesses and sanctioning obstruction.

It could also bring in strengthened domestic processes. Kenya could mount credible prosecutions for crimes arising from 2007–08, or implement meaningful reparations, truth commissions or institutional reforms. Such measures would require political will and transparent, victim-centred processes to be seen as legitimate.

There is a possibility of a continuing archival role for the ICC. The Court’s public records, judicial decisions and investigative materials will remain a resource for historians, journalists and victims.

Even without new prosecutions, the record can underpin advocacy, reparative claims and historical memory.

There is however the risk of an accountability gap.

If neither arrests at The Hague nor credible domestic measures occur, the result will likely be a long-term political and moral gap that undermines victim confidence in justice systems and weakens deterrence against future abuses.

Bottom line

The ICC’s formal closure of investigative operations in Kenya signals an end to the broad, years-long international inquiry into the 2007–08 post-election violence.

But closure is not the same as finality. Two outstanding Article 70 suspects remain the subject of active pursuit, and the Court retains the public record of its work.

For victims, closure narrows the avenues for international trials and places more weight on domestic remedies, reparative measures and collective memory.

For the international community, the remaining fugitives become a test of whether states will cooperate to enforce the Court’s orders and sustain the rule of law at an international level.

Whether the ICC’s exit from day-to-day investigation reduces political tension or produces an accountability vacuum in Kenya depends on next steps: arrests and prosecutions of the fugitives, credible domestic action for crimes and reparations for victims, and robust public engagement with the historical record.

The narrow “hunt for fugitives” is therefore small in scale but large in implication. It will help determine whether the Court’s legacy in Kenya is one of meaningful accountability or of an unfinished pursuit of justice.