For
decades, Kenya cultivated a reputation as one of Africa’s most influential
peace brokers. From hosting talks on Somalia to
facilitating negotiations in South Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa, Nairobi
became synonymous with backchannel diplomacy, regional dialogue and crisis
mediation.
But that
status is now under strain.
From the
stalled Tumaini Initiative on South Sudan, to Kenya’s contested role in Sudan’s
Quartet and emerging questions over its neutrality in the DRC peace efforts,
Kenya’s traditional mediation authority is weakening at precisely the moment
regional conflicts are multiplying.
But there
are lessons to draw from Finland, the Nordic country that is the go to for
mediation engagements.
At a
recent high-level exchange with visiting journalists in Helsinki, Finland’s
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Outi Holopainen, offered an
instructive comparison.
Finland,
which has no colonial footprint and limited geopolitical weight, has
historically positioned itself as a global mediator through structured,
multi-layered diplomacy.
“Peace
mediation is a core element of our foreign and security policy. We strongly
believe in peace mediation for conflict solution and prevention.
“We have
played an active role in international efforts to promote and strengthen
mediation. Our conviction is based also on our own historical experience and
track record,” the diplomat said.
Finland’s
peace efforts are not new. It goes back to the 1970s, when global leaders met
in Helsinki for three years of negotiations that resulted in the Helsinki
Declaration of 1975.
It
established a foundational framework connecting international security with
human rights and sovereign equality. This legacy evolved into today’s
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Beyond the
historical reputation, Finland’s institutional discipline, neutrality,
strategic consistency and sustained investment in mediation infrastructure are
lessons top draw from.
And here,
Kenya may be falling short.
Kenya’s
mediation legacy—and its current strain
Kenya’s
rise as a regional mediator was not accidental. Its geographical position,
relatively stable political system compared to its neighbours, and strong
diplomatic service made it a natural convening power in the Horn of Africa.
Nairobi
became a preferred venue for negotiations on Somalia’s transition processes,
while Kenyan diplomats and envoys such as former Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka
and Gen (Rtd) Lazarus Sumbeiywo played central roles in South Sudan’s peace
architecture. This included the Comprehensive Peace Agreement process and later
regional initiatives.
More
recently, Kenya positioned itself within multiple overlapping mediation tracks.
These include the Tumaini Initiative aimed at revitalising South Sudan’s
stalled peace framework by onboarding the holdout opposition groups that did
not sign the 2018 agreement.
There is
also the collapsed IGAD Quartet Process on the Sudan, which had President
William Ruto as the lead mediator. This failed after the Sudan Armed Forces
commander and the Junta leader Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan accused Ruto of
harbouring Rapid Support Forces commanders in Nairobi.
Engagements
in eastern DRC, where multiple overlapping regional initiatives compete for
influence and legitimacy, are also strained.
In South
Sudan, the Tumaini process has struggled with fragmentation among parties and
limited enforcement mechanisms.
In Sudan,
Kenya’s role within the quartet has been questioned amid
accusations of inconsistent positioning and competing regional alliances.
In the
DRC, mediation efforts remain heavily crowded, with the East African Community frameworks struggling to
produce unified outcomes.
The result
is a perception problem that while Kenya is still present, it is no longer
always central. It is losing authority.
MEDIATION
AS A SYSTEM
Against
this backdrop, Finland’s model of peace mediation offers a striking contrast.
Holopainen
described Finland’s approach not as ad hoc engagement in crises, but as a
structured foreign policy pillar embedded in institutions, networks, and
long-term partnerships.
The
approach starts from the bottom, with children.
The
CMI—Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation, started by former Finland President, has
introduced a game called Kiista to schools, which essentially inculcates
conflict resolution skills to children at a young age.
There is
also the Youth Peace Mediation Mentorship Programme. It was established on the
basis of an MoU on mediation between Finland and South Africa to support
inclusivity in mediation processes and promote mediation through multilateral
cooperation.
“The aim
is to strengthen young people’s knowledge of mediation and to provide
opportunities to network with mediation practitioner. There is also
peer-to-peer learning among youth is at the core of the programme,” Ansa Kilpeläinen,
a specialist at the Finland Foreign Affairs Ministry, said.
There are
also other structured systems in Parliament under the Peace Mediation Network,
Nordic Women Mediators Network, CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency and through the UN, in which former
Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto serves as the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy for Sudan.
It is also
in this regard that Finland’s Centre for Peace Mediation was established within
its Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2020. The centre coordinates state-led
mediation efforts, supports training and connects governmental and
non-governmental actors in a unified framework.
Finland
also operates through what it calls “Groups of Friends of Mediation,”
co-chaired with partners such as Turkey, Spain, and Switzerland in different
multilateral settings, including the UN, OSCE and the EU.
This
system ensures mediation is not dependent on momentary political interest, but
institutional continuity.
In Africa,
Finland has deliberately positioned itself as a partner rather than a dominant
actor.
It
cooperates with countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Qatar and Turkey in
mediation-related initiatives, often working quietly through technical support,
training, and dialogue facilitation. The emphasis, officials maintain, is not
visibility but credibility.
One of the
most striking contrasts between Kenya and Finland lies in approach.
Kenya’s
mediation efforts are often driven by geopolitical urgency or regional crises.
When
conflict erupts in Somalia, South Sudan, or Sudan, Kenya is quickly drawn in
due to proximity and diplomatic relevance. However, these engagements are often
reactive, fragmented across institutions and influenced by shifting political
alliances.
Finland,
by contrast, treats mediation as a permanent foreign policy capability.
This
includes dedicated institutional infrastructure (the mediation centre),
formalised international partnerships (structured mediation groups), continuous
cooperation with NGOs and civil society and long-term thematic priorities such
as inclusive peace, water diplomacy, and engagement with religious leaders.
This
institutionalisation allows Finland to maintain neutrality and consistency even
when political environments shift.
Kenya
largely operates in a more politicised regional environment where perceptions
of alignment can weaken trust.
NEUTRALITY
AND CREDIBILITY
In
mediation, perception is as important as capacity. Finland’s diplomatic positioning emphasises
neutrality, multilateralism, and adherence to international law. Even as a NATO member, it insists its security alignment does not
affect its mediation credibility.
Kenya,
however, faces more complex regional entanglements.
Its
proximity to conflict zones, deep political relationships with regional actors
and economic interests in neighbouring states have occasionally raised
questions about impartiality.
In Sudan,
for example, Kenya’s role in facilitating meetings involving the RSF has drawn
criticism, and the collapse of Igad Quartet framework.
In South
Sudan, what has been termed as interference — such as the push for the release
of political prisoners and consequently hosting them in Nairobi — has
complicated its mediation authority.
In the
DRC, the hosting of the Congo River Alliance, with representatives from M23,
in December 2023 eroded trust.
HORN OF
AFRICA PARADOX
Kenya’s
geographical position emerges as both its greatest asset and its most
significant constraint.
Being in
the Horn of Africa allows it to respond quickly to crises. And while Nairobi,
remains a key diplomatic hub hosting UN agencies, regional organisations and
peace negotiations, its proximity also means entanglement.
Unlike
Finland, which operates far from the immediate theatres of most conflicts it
mediates in, Kenya is embedded in the same regional ecosystems as the crises it
seeks to resolve.
This
creates overlapping pressures such as security concerns linked to cross-border
instability, refugee inflows from South Sudan, Somalia and Sudan, political
sensitivities tied to neighbouring governments and competing regional blocs
such as IGAD and the EAC.
The result
is a constant balancing act between engagement and neutrality.
INCLUSIVITY
AND LONG-TERM PEACE
Another
lesson from Finland lies in its emphasis on inclusivity. Holopainen highlighted
women (Nordic Women Mediators Network), youth (Youth Peace and Security
agenda), and civil society participation as central to sustainable peace processes.
Finland
also integrates gender equality as both a normative commitment and a practical
peacebuilding tool.
Historically,
Finland attributes its own development into a stable welfare state partly to
early and broad political participation, including women’s suffrage in 1906.
While
Kenya has made significant progress in gender inclusion in governance and
peacebuilding, implementation in regional mediation processes remains uneven.
In many
Horn of Africa negotiations, representation still tends to be elite-driven,
with limited grassroots participation.
MEDIATION
FATIGUE IN AFRICA
Across
Sudan, South Sudan, and DRC, mediation fatigue appears to be emerging.
Multiple
overlapping frameworks such as IGAD, EAC, AU-led mechanisms and UN processes have created a crowded diplomatic
environment.
Instead of
reinforcing each other, these initiatives sometimes compete, duplicate efforts,
or suffer from coordination gaps.
Kenya, as
a participant in many of these structures, risks being associated with
fragmentation rather than coherence.
Finland’s
approach suggests an alternative of fewer interventions, but more structured
engagement, clearer division of roles and sustained institutional memory.
Despite
the challenges, Kenya is far from losing its relevance entirely. It still
possesses key assets such as strong diplomatic corps with regional
experience and Nairobi’s status as a diplomatic hub.
Kenya also
has longstanding relationships across Horn of Africa political elites and
remains and active member and authority of the regional organisations.
However,
maintaining its relevance — and in borrowing from Helsinki — Nairobi needs to
align with the evolving mediation landscape demands.
This
includes institutionalising mediation by having a more formal mediation
architecture, ensure strategic neutrality with clearer separation between
national interests and mediation roles to rebuild trust among conflicting
parties and finally, treat peacebuilding as a sustained policy domain, not a
reaction to crises.