As soon as word went out that the Gabonese military had deposed President Ali Bongo Ondimba on August 30, 2023, excited Kenyan social media users jokingly (or maybe not at all) loudly wondered when coups would hit closer home.
Well, first things first: the simple answer is “never!”
Before we go into whether these coups have become the preserve of Francophone countries, or what are the real underlying issues, let us study why, in my view, the chances of the coup culture reaching our shores are almost nil.
In Kenya’s post-independence history, there have been just three issues involving its military. The first was a mutiny in 1964 at the Lanet Army barracks over poor pay. The second was a reported coup plot involving Chief of Staff Maj Gen Joseph Ndolo in 1971 and the last one an actual coup attempt carried out by junior Kenya Air Force servicemen in 1982.
We can dismiss the 1964 one as mere transitional teething problems, a common feature in Africa as residents took power from colonialists, which generally included changing the allegiances of the militaries, from an overlord in Europe to a native commander in chief.
Many serving black servicemen of that generation had been hired to fight for the British crown in World War II, with colonialists confining their services to lower cadres only. It is easy to see how this band of soldiers would riot, demanding better pay from the new government of Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta.
The 1971 coup plot was nipped in the bud, so there isn’t much to report about it, except that after Maj Gen Ndolo was prevailed upon to retire, there were no reported disturbances within the barracks, which would have been the only significant evidence of the plot having support within the ranks.
The 1982 version was the eye opener. First, it exposed the weakness of military intelligence in discovering such plots and crushing them early. More importantly, the coup failed the three critical components to be successful; wide civilian support, collusion within senior ranks and the fact that it originated from a smaller service (the Air Force was a woefully small command compared to the Army).
In subsequent years, and especially after then Brigadier Lazaro Sumbeiywo created the Directorate of Military Intelligence from scratch around 1987 (it was initially known as the Directorate of Liaison Department within the Office of the President). Military intelligence became a key cog of the thoroughly professional force built by Generals Jackson Mulinge, Mahmoud Mohamed and the peerless Daudi Rerimoi Chepkonga Tonje over those years. Simply put, the intelligence failures that allowed a coup attempt in 1982 are near-impossible today.
There are certain things that Kenyans take for granted. One of them is that our five-year cycle of elections, regardless of the challenges or perceptions of these elections as less-than-credible, creates a semblance of democracy and the perception that no matter how bad the person who takes power is, at least we have another go in five years to try and change that.
But at most, we can live with the “mistake” for 10 years. This luxury does not exist in most of the “coup belt”, or their elections are that much worse than ours that they do not qualify for comparison.
The other is that a coup is in itself manifestly a product of ill-disciplined soldiers. Take a look at some of the members of these military juntas, especially in West Africa, stomping the ground in poor formation, dressed like militiamen, pushing through crowds, and you will see what I mean.
Discipline is the staple diet of a professional military. In this, Kenya’s (and I dare add Rwanda’s) have no match in the region. What may surprise many is that the military parades at public functions can give you a glimpse of the discipline levels of a force. The efficiency with which a close-order drill at a military parade mirrors the combat-drill in war formations and helps indicate force discipline in general. You can go back to YouTube and view parades by the Rwandese and Kenyan forces and see how it all falls in place, unlike their coup belt counterparts.
Thirdly, as a close observer of military and security history, each time I hear of a coup, I check to see what mineral the country is rich in. Gabon is an oil-rich country while Niger, the country where a coup preceded Gabon’s, is rich in uranium.
Coups are also essentially a fight between the uniformed forces and the civilian rulers on looting of national resources, especially with foreign actors who are intent on exploiting these minerals, tapping up the soldiers for a coup. I saw Gabonese soldiers ransacking houses of minsters who had stashed large amounts of cash in their houses. Conventional wisdom has it that soon enough, the new rulers in combat gear would soon have cash stashed the same way, because the love for money knows no boundary.
Where however the comparison between Francophone and Anglophone Africa may be made is the perception that France has for years perpetuated what at face value looks like entrenched cronyism. The cronyism stars kleptocrats with no eye on term limits, in presidential systems where power is centralised in the presidency and state resources are plundered by a few.
It is a breeding ground for disenchantment among the people, which eventually becomes a ready opening for military juntas. For ultimately, a coup must enjoy the support of the population for it to succeed. In this regard, Britain, the world’s foremost parliamentary democracy, at least routinely calls for democracy in its former colonies.
There is a pandemic of stolen elections in Africa, especially the variety where tinpot dictators and deep state candidates reach constitutional thresholds by the width of a virus.
I do not believe that military coups are a sustainable solution to civilian power grabs. Indeed, coups are just recipes for countercoups, which then means that a coup sets up a chain reaction of countless other coups and instability in a country. Uganda in the 70s and 80s is a living example of this. But I also believe that a credible conversation around the place of democracy and attendant protocols must be had before we dismiss coups in totality.
Meanwhile, I can assure Kenyan social media class that their military remains the most credible institution in the country, built on professionalism and principles. To add onto this, military intelligence now has such close eyes on soldiers that it would be impossible to meet and politic in the mess the way Hezekiah Ochuka, the 1982 coup leader, and his colleagues, did. At any rate, given our very tribally divided civilian society, only a foolish soldier would carry out a coup while expecting universal civilian support, an ingredient in successful coups.
I am certain that these difficult issues must have gone through the minds of the senior command in 2008, as Kenyan civilians slaughtered each other during the post-election violence, as regional leaders called on the Kenyan military to intervene to save the nation. You see, once the soldiers leave the barracks to intervene in civilian conflicts, it is difficult to tell where the chips will fall next, so common sense urges for neutrality no matter how tempting the situation is.
Political commentator