They must be warned it is every single vote they cast on August 9, and not the braggadocios statements from the political podiums and TV talk shows, that will make the difference.
Every social scientist and political observer knows certain decisions made months ahead of the voting day such as registration of voters and past voting patterns by different social-cultural groups have profoundly impacted past election results.
It is in public domain that in the past two general elections — 2013 and 2017 — when Raila and Uhuru Kenyatta were the main top contenders, the ODM leader’s key strongholds in Western Kenya, Nyanza and Coast, among others, posted lower voter registration and voting patterns compared to his rivals’. This had a consequential impact on the results.
The regions cited above have posted more or less similar voter registration and voting patterns in all other past general elections, a manifestation of social-cultural attitudes towards politics, political power, and how different groups view politics, and how it relates to their local realities.
The recent projections by pollsters casting Raila being ahead of the UDA candidate may compound these past observations, if campaigns relax in bringing out every vote and voters in casting it.
Azimio la Umoja One Kenya Coalition supporters must be acutely aware every ballot not cast is a vote for the opposition.
For a quick illustration of how Raila support bases may have inadvertently denied him victory in the past by their laid back behaviour, the 2013 and 2017 voter registration and voting patterns are worth noting.
Traditional Railamania bastions of Kakamega and Bungoma counties in Western Kenya, Mombasa and Kilifi in the Coast have comparable population numbers with Uhuru Kenyatta’s traditional strongholds of Kiambu and Nakuru according to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
However, when it comes to voter registration and actual voting, Raila and Uhuru strongholds exhibited drastically divergent behavior in 2002, 2013 and 2017.
The KNBS population census (2009) shows Kakamega had a population of 1,660,651 people, compared to Kiambu’s 1,630,734 people.
In 2013, Kakamega registered 568,151 voters, while Kiambu had 863,199.
On voting day, 474,779 voters ( 84 per cent) voted in Kakamega, while Kiambu posted 781,735 (91 per cent) turn out.
With the assumption that the bulk of Kakamega votes went into Raila’s basket, while those in Kiambu votes went into Uhuru’s ballot box, it is clear the Kiambu electorate gave its candidate a leg up, while Kakamega let their candidate down, all by dint of variation of behavior in registration and voting.
Nakuru with a population of 1,603,335 registered 699,594 voters in 2013, out of which 616,318 (85 per cent) turned out to vote.
This was much higher than Bungoma, an assumed Raila stronghold, with a population of 1,630,734, but which only registered 412,118 voters, with 351,005 (85 per cent) turning out to vote.
Mombasa, with a population of 939,370 people (2009 census), registered 413,069 voters in 2013, while only 272,318 of these (66 per cent) turned out to vote. In 2017, Mombasa registered 580,223 voters.
The same pattern held in Kilifi that with a population of 1,109,735 people (2009), registered 336,410 voters in 2013, and only a paltry 218,174 came out to vote. In 2017, it registered 508,068 voters.
The coastal pattern drastically contrasts voter behavior in Nyeri (presumed Uhuru stronghold), with a population of 693,558 (2009), that registered 375,059 voters in 2013, with 331,024 (93 per cent) turning out to vote!
In 2017, Nyeri registered 456,949 voters, almost same level with Kilifi, which has nearly the double population.
These variations in voter behavior indicate drastically different political awareness and consciousness about political power, in that many ready and available votes in Raila strongholds were left unmobilzed and uncast and which could have altered the outcomes at the ballot drastically.
This is especially critical given the razor thin margins between losers and winners in the last two general elections.
A quick scan of the 2002 voter registration and voting patterns under the old provincial administrative maps, the same regional contours are discernible in that year’s election when Mwai Kibaki of Narc faced Uhuru of Kanu in the Moi succession race.
According to the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya’s figures, Central province posted the highest number of registered voters at 1,566,019, out of which 910,554 (58 per cent) were cast, compared to the Coast province, where 888,934 voters registered, but only a paltry 276,547 (31 per cent) were cast.
Although Coast was largely perceived the so-called “Kanu zones” in the political parlance of the time, dismal voter turnout cost the Kanu candidate considerable margins.
In the then Eastern province, 1,738,169 voters were registered, but only 473,079 votes were cast, representing a dismal 27 per cent of the total.
The Northeastern province had 219,055 voters, but only 42,887 (19 per cent) voted.
In Nairobi, some 894,471 voters were registered and only 366,458 (41 per cent) voted.
In Nyanza, 1.5 million voters were listed, and 840,268 (53 per cent) voted, a higher percentage than Western Kenyan that had registered 1,207,130 and only 644.067 (53 per cent) cast their ballot, even with Michael Kijana Wamalwa magic.
From the foregoing, it is clear the so-called tyranny of numbers popular in Kenya political lingo is actually misplaced, at least in part.
The patterns indicate regions perceived as sub-prime voter baskets such as Western and the Coast are actually in the top league of political real estate but do not exert their real book value at the ballot box on voting day.
With this in mind, Azimio strategists, well wishers and supporters must go all flat out to mobilize every vote to make it count in raising the margins for the third liberation pair of Raila and Martha Karua.
For once, the traditional laggard regions should be targeted with extra mobilisation to make them count in doing their full civic duty in harvesting each available vote to make the revolution happen.
