Kenya has made significant progress in its response against
terrorism and violent extremism due to concerted efforts by various
stakeholders.
According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, the decreased
terror activities within Kenya can be attributed to enhanced counter terrorism
operations, intelligence sharing, inter-agency collaboration and community
engagement within the last year.
The report further says the number of deaths attributed to
terrorism, especially from the al-Shabaab, which is predominantly the most
active terror group in Kenya and Somalia, dropped from 512 in 2023 to 387 in
2024, a decline of almost 25 per cent.
Of the 387 deaths attributed to the group, 91 per cent
occurred in Somalia, and the remaining nine per cent occurred in Kenya.
Al-Shabaab was responsible for 33 deaths in Kenya in 2024, a 57 per cent
decrease compared to the year prior.
Regionally, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding the Sahel, which remains terrorism's epicentre, accounting for over half of all global
terrorism deaths, are now at their lowest since 2016, dropping by 10%.
Despite the gains, terrorism continues to pose a threat to
global and national security as it evolves with the tides of technology,
ideology, and geopolitics and hence calling for an adjustment to the fight
against it.
EARLY THREATS
Independent Kenya experienced its first bomb blasts, though
not linked directly to terrorism, in early 1975.
The blasts at the popular Starlight Night Club on Tom Mboya
Street and the other one near the Hilton Hotel remain somewhat mysterious since
the motivation behind the attack was never revealed.
In 1980, 20 people of several nationalities were killed and
many others injured after the Norfolk hotel was bombed by terrorists.
To show the changing threat landscape that government
agencies have to respond to, the August 1998 Nairobi attack and the 2001
Kikambala bombing were believed to have been orchestrated by al-Qaeda operatives
who had a more organised, centralised command structure.
The 2013 Westgate mall attack, the 2014 Mpeketoni
attack and the 2019 Dusit hotel attack may have been inspired by small cells
operating under a more decentralised structure, supporting the earlier assertion
that terrorism is evolving.
Since Kenya was designated by the US government as ‘an
anchor state’ in the Horn of Africa and a ‘frontline’ in the ‘Global War on
Terror’ GWOT the government had to come up with new strategies to respond to
the threat applying both hard and soft approaches such as intelligence
operations, border security, community policing, and counter-radicalization
programs.
In 2016, the government came up with a National Strategy to
Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) aimed at preventing, countering and reversing
radicalisation.
The strategy was to employ several tactics touching on
Counter Violent Extremism, to minimise sympathy for terrorism as
a means to change society or politics.
It also sought to promote patriotism for Kenya’s nationhood
and enhance government support to local communities targeted by violent
extremists by addressing communal grievances upon which extremist recruiters
mobilise support.
In addition, the plan aimed to develop early warning systems
and measures that can help the community recognise the signs adopted by those
being radicalised.
The strategy also looks into ways to rehabilitate and
reintegrate individuals who disengage from violent extremism, develop expertise
in non-coercive approaches and effectively use law enforcement to deter and
prosecute radicalising individuals and institutions.
LESSONS LEARNT
Over time, drawing from the strategy and lessons drawn from
other countries, any counter-narrative has to be guided by local contexts.
This includes the need to prevent and resolve conflicts.
For example, in the
Sahel Conflict, deaths in the Sahel reached their highest level since 2012,
surpassing 25,000 for the first time.
Weak governance, ethnic tensions, and ecological degradation
have fueled terrorism, worsened by transnational jihadist growth and
geopolitical competition, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2025.
Another lesson learnt from diverse experiences is the need
to coordinate information sharing among key players.
To achieve the required results, the civil society and
governments must work together.
Security agencies across the sections should also
collaborate during operations to minimize the risks and effectively handle active and looming threats.
The involvement of communities in dealing with
radicalisation is also another way of dealing with the threats associated with
terrorism.
Investing in de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, and
re-integration is key in winning the war of ideas with violent extremist
groups.
This is why the government must continue to engage religious
leaders, youth leaders from across the economic divide and the society in
general by integrating communities into national security frameworks.
Recognition that there must be inclusive policies to address
the various socio-economic and political drivers that drive violent extremism
narratives has also helped a lot.
Countries like the Netherlands have implemented various programs
aimed at preventing radicalisation, including initiatives focused on education,
social work, and working with families and communities affected by terrorism
and violent extremism.
The positive results witnessed in Kenya and the region at
large are a result of continued collaboration by countries on law
enforcement, intelligence sharing, and border security to disrupt terrorist
activities.
Although the media has a right to report on terrorist acts
and potential threats, training of media professionals on how they can make a
positive contribution to the prevention of terrorism remains a high priority in
the era of fake news and AI.
Practitioners, both in the mainstream and new media, should
avoid publishing graphic images and information portraying terrorists as
powerful.
Omare is a security expert based in Nairobi
