While it’s easier to associate Libya’s troubled economy with inflation charts and dwindling oil output, what fails to make headlines are the opportunities lost, the gradual erosion of reform and competence that once held real promise. These losses aren’t just in the form of missed deals or deteriorating infrastructure. They’re the direct result of pushing aside technocrats: individuals who brought expertise, stability, and vision to institutions still reeling from war and political chaos.
Libya hasn’t merely squandered economic projects; it has discarded the very people who could have delivered them.
When figures like Imad Ben Rajab, Faysel al-Gergab,
and Hassan Bouhadi were sidelined, Libya lost more than professionals. It lost
its best shot at genuine recovery. Their removal didn’t just mark bureaucratic
shifts; it exposed a broader retreat from technocratic governance, leaving
behind a vacuum filled by short-termism, rivalry, and corruption. The cost is
visible: delayed projects, institutional decay, missed foreign investment, and
growing public disillusionment.
After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s fragile institutions relied heavily on technocrats to steer the economy through chaos. But over time, many of these figures were sidelined, their roles diminished by political infighting and factionalism. The consequences have been far-reaching. One such figure was Faysel al-Gergab, the reform-minded chairman of Libya’s state-owned telecoms holding company, LPTIC. Western-educated and technocratic in style, al-Gergab pushed for greater transparency in Libya’s opaque telecoms sector and worked to reintegrate national firms into global digital markets.
His removal came amid growing resistance from entrenched interests and internal political rivalries, ultimately stalling efforts to modernise one of Libya’s most strategic infrastructure sectors. Another key figure was Hassan Bouhadi, who chaired the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) between 2014 and 2016.
During his tenure, Bouhadi prioritised asset protection and legal restructuring to shield Libya’s sovereign wealth fund, worth tens of billions, from both international litigation and domestic power struggles. He played a central role in defending LIA assets in international courts, including efforts to block unauthorised fund transfers and prevent political factions from exploiting state wealth.
His resignation, triggered by institutional rivalries and legal ambiguity, was a blow to transparency and long-term investment planning. Perhaps the most symbolic case is that of Imad Ben Rajab, who from 2018 to 2023 led the NOC’s International Marketing Department. He oversaw Libya’s oil exports, built relationships with major global energy partners, and represented Libya at OPEC meetings and UN-coordinated anti-smuggling efforts.
He was widely credited with stabilising Libya’s oil export revenues during volatile times and expanding cooperation with companies like CNPC and Eni. His 2023 conviction on fuel import charges, widely viewed as politically motivated, removed a key stabilising figure from the energy sector and underscored the systemic risks facing professional managers in Libya’s fractured governance environment.
These were not just bureaucrats. They were institutional anchors. Their sidelining didn’t simply shuffle personnel, it unraveled decades of experience, broke continuity, and dismantled some of the last remaining barriers against corruption.
Sidelining technocrats and competent leaders has cost Libya dearly in tangible ways. Major oil licensing rounds, once seen as crucial steps toward modernising the sector and attracting foreign investment, have been repeatedly delayed, disrupted, or abandoned altogether.
Plans to upgrade refineries, pipelines, and storage facilities have languished, stuck on paper or derailed by ongoing political disputes, weak oversight, and institutional paralysis. The impact is clear. The Ras Lanuf refinery upgrade, a project with the potential to significantly boost Libya’s refining capacity and economic output, remains stalled indefinitely. In May 2025, a major pipeline leak along the Hamada oilfields forced a shutdown that halted crude flow to Libya’s largest refinery at Zawiya, severely disrupting production and underscoring the high cost of deferred maintenance and poor planning.
These systemic failures have drained Libya’s productive potential, leading to fuel shortages, power outages, soaring black-market prices, and a deepening economic crisis for ordinary citizens. Without the steady hand of technocratic leadership, Libya's oil sector remains fragmented and inefficient, missing opportunities that might have supported national recovery and growth.
Libya’s predicament is clear. The country has long treated competence and expertise as expendable, turning sound economic policy and reform into a battleground for political rivalry. What Libya urgently needs is leadership grounded in professionalism and a long-term vision, not short-term deals designed to appease competing factions.
Figures like Faysel al-Gergab, Hassan Bouhadi, and Imad Ben Rajab, despite their imperfections, understood the delicate balance between politics and effective stewardship. Their disciplined and clear-headed approach kept Libya’s economic machinery functioning during turbulent times. When they were removed, a vacuum formed, quickly filled by opportunists and power seekers at the expense of national progress.
True progress requires shifting focus away from which faction controls resources or signs fleeting deals. It depends on strengthening the economy, restoring institutional integrity, and improving the well-being of the Libyan people. Achieving this demands professionals with the expertise, discipline, and clarity necessary to navigate complex challenges and guide the country toward lasting stability. Without such stewardship, Libya risks continued instability and the loss of its vast potential.
