The eight officers, seven General Service Unit officers, and a police driver were in operation searching for the group, which raided Turkana East and stole cattle. Peace crusader Mary Kanyaman, and Napeitom senior chief Gilbert Lomukuny, were also killed in the raid.
President William Ruto's administration reacted to the killings by launching a multi-agency security operation, involving paramilitary police GSU and the Administrative Police. The response demonstrates the state’s conduct of territoriality —control or monopolising control of space in the context of organised violence —legitimising/monopolising the use of force.
The insecurity in Namariat and the government reaction to such killings are common in Suguta Valley — a valley bordering Samburu County to the north, south of lake Turkana, and stretching towards the north of Baringo county. They demonstrate state conduct of territoriality as a means of solving insecurity.
For example, in 1996, Turkana community armed group shot down a police chopper ferrying James Nyandoro, the district commissioner at the time. Nyandoro was killed with other officers on board, and the confrontation with the group left a casualty of 46 police officers.
The chopper was on a mission to recover raided cattle in Suguta valley. The killings led to President Daniel Moi’s administration retaliating with multi-agency security —administration and paramilitary police, including the army. This lead to thousands fleeing their homes due to security forces’ torture, murder, and human right abuses in the community where the group exists.
Similarly, Suguta valley was labeled the ‘valley of death’ by Beauttah Manga when 42 police officers were killed on November 12, 2012 in an operation to recover 450 cattle raided from Manyattas in Lomerok, Turkana.
The 42 were among an operation of 107 police officers and 60 Kenya Police Reservists tasked to recover the raided cattle. President Mwai Kibaki retaliated with a multi-agency security operation, with the military taking the lead.
Such organized violence —legitimising/monopolising the use of force also led to curfew, torture, murders, and human rights abuses targeting the Turkana community in Lomerok.
Ruto administration's reaction to the killings in Namariat is the conduct of his predecessors, and the locals are likely to flee their homes reacting to the fear of a curfew, raids, and torture by the security forces for weeks or months to come.
SUGUTA VALLEY: ORGANIZED VIOLENCE AND TERRITORIALITY
The Namariat area in Kakiteitei village, Kapedo, Napeitom ward, is part of the larger Suguta valley. The valley is a triangular territory of enemies - the Turkana, the Pokot, and the Samburu - and insecurity can be explained by the lenses of territoriality and organized violence.
The former refers to the control or monopolisation of spaces, while the latter connotes monopolizing or legitimising the use of force. Both imply traditional state-oriented security strategies.
Territoriality and state control scenario is not always suitable in some situations. For example, territoriality is not ideal for the northern Kenyan due to state limitations of security capacity or ignoring such spaces. Clan politics is more vital in such areas, and communities do not trust state institutions.
The community mistrust is due to the mentioned limitation and ignoring such spaces.
Territoriality is fluid, and it is not just the control of physical space, but also sociological —the armed groups taking advantage of their ethnic groups in a particular area.
It is also psychological —winning the hearts and minds. Thus, the sociological and psychological aspect implies that territoriality can be ideological. Similarly, organised violence can also mean the groups legitimising the use of force due to limited security capacity or presence of state security, but sometimes the state ignores such spaces.
With such state limitation in mind, these groups take advantage of semi-territoriality —spaces with limited state control, giving them a de-facto control and relative freedom to operate.
Semi-territoriality implies spaces where it is challenging to identify state institutions like the police force, or if they exist, they have small bases. The state sometimes has strong military patrols or campaigns but are not maintained.
SOME RECOMMENDATION TO SECURITY STRATEGIES
Suguta valley exemplifies a semi-territoriality scenario. The September 25 killings demonstrate the freedom the armed groups enjoy due to state limitation of security capacity.
However, these groups operate clandestinely because they cannot engage the state in a conventional war —open confrontation. They take advantage of the absence of the security fraternity due to the nature of the terrain and poor roads. The area is mountainous, bordering mount Ng’iro to the east, and has mudflats, making it impossible to access, especially when it rains.
Developments such as Lamu South Sudan Ethiopia Transport corridor —a multi-billion-dollar road, railway, airports, and ports - is intended to cross Suguta valley, and it has already started shaping the poor road networks in the valley.
The Lapsset project crossing Lodwar to Nakadok, Kenya-South Sudan border will shape organised violence and territoriality scenario in Suguta valley, enhancing security and giving faster access to the CBAGs, and future roadside hi-jackings.
A hybrid security arrangement is a recommended security strategy in semi-territoriality spaces. Such arrangement implies a security assemblage, a complex structure, and collaborating between private and public in offering security.
Private organisations such as the Northern Rangeland Trust and the British Group 4 Securicor (G4S) can provide technology, funding, effective gain, and knowledge because they have to give quality to their donors.
The challenge is that private security companies focus on funding, and if such funding is no more, then the groups can take advantage of the private security group personnel and equipment. For example, the NRT rangers recruited from the community could join the moran or warriors in conducting cattle rustling.
Community-oriented policing implies people-centered police; policing WITH the community instead of policing the community.
Article 244 of the Constitution and Sections 41 and 96 of the National Police Service Act stipulate community policing authority. The authority comprises civilian officials in the county working with the security fraternity with the strategy of community-oriented policing. This will enhance community trust and intelligence strategies because the armed groups gain confidence due to the absence of the state, or the state firmly applying the law in an emergency —semi-territoriality scenario.
The Kenya Police Reservists are recruited from the community to help the limited police personnel, and they can offer local knowledge to the security complex gaining intelligence on the operation of the armed groups within the community.
However, the lack of mapping and remuneration of the KPRs will lead them to the cattle rustling b because they have guns and need money to survive.
Therefore, without proper implementation of the pluralist form of security, hybrid security, and community policing, the state-oriented security and police operating in Suguta Valley are at risk of the armed groups’ clandestine tactics, and a repeat of the Namariat killings is possible.
Okwany is a research fellow at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, the University of Nairobi.
Atieno is a research fellow at Bonn International Center for Conflict studies.
