As tensions intensify between the United States, Israel and Iran, the
aftershocks are spreading far beyond the Middle East.
For Eastern Africa,
particularly the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, the unfolding
confrontation is not a distant geopolitical drama but an immediate and evolving
strategic challenge.
Maritime security, economic stability and fragile regional
security architectures now face mounting pressure from forces largely outside
the region’s control.
The urgency lies in the fact that Eastern Africa is being
drawn into a geopolitical environment increasingly defined by volatility,
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity.
In such circumstances, the insights of the Prussian military
strategist Carl von Clausewitz remain highly relevant. In his seminal
work On War, Clausewitz warned that conflict rarely unfolds in
predictable ways. Instead, it operates within what he famously called the “fog
of war”, a condition in which information is incomplete, events unfold
unpredictably and decision-makers must act under uncertainty.
Compounding this
fog is what Clausewitz described as “friction”, the accumulation of small but
disruptive obstacles that derail plans and complicate strategy.
Today, Eastern
Africa finds itself navigating precisely such a fog as the US-Israel-Iran
confrontation threatens to spill across regions and sectors.
The most immediate manifestation of this strategic uncertainty lies
along the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of
Aden, one of the
world’s most critical maritime corridors.
This narrow waterway connects
shipping routes between Europe, Asia and the Middle East and sits directly
adjacent to the Horn of Africa. As tensions between Washington, Tel Aviv and
Tehran escalate, the risk of disruptions along this corridor is growing.
Iran-aligned actors, particularly the Houthis in Yemen, have already demonstrated
the capability to target commercial vessels and strategic infrastructure.
If
attacks intensify, shipping companies may be forced to reroute vessels around
the Cape of Good Hope, a significantly longer and more expensive journey that
disrupts global supply chains and delays delivery schedules.
For Eastern African economies that depend heavily on maritime imports,
the consequences would be immediate and severe. Shipping costs would rise,
insurance premiums would surge and the prices of essential commodities,
particularly fuel and food, would escalate sharply.
In Clausewitzian terms,
such disruptions represent the friction of modern geopolitics: unpredictable
events that complicate economic planning and magnify the difficulty of
maintaining stability in times of crisis.
However, the visible tensions along maritime routes represent only one
dimension of the emerging threat landscape. Beneath the surface lies a more
opaque and potentially dangerous layer of covert operations and proxy warfare.
Clausewitz observed that much of what determines the outcome of conflict often
remains hidden from direct observation.
This insight resonates strongly in the
present crisis. Iran has historically maintained networks across parts of
Africa and has previously been linked to attempted attacks targeting Western
and Israeli interests on the continent.
Should the confrontation intensify,
Eastern Africa could become an arena for retaliatory operations targeting
diplomatic missions, tourist centres, or commercial infrastructure.
At the same time, extremist groups operating within the region could
seek to exploit the geopolitical turbulence. Militant organisations such as al-Shabaab may benefit indirectly through expanded smuggling routes, technological
transfers, or shifting alliances created by the broader confrontation.
In an
already fragile security environment — particularly in Somalia — such
developments could complicate counter-terrorism efforts and undermine regional
stability.
The economic consequences of the conflict may prove equally
destabilising. Eastern African economies remain heavily dependent on imported
fuel and global supply chains that pass through the Red Sea corridor.
Even
limited disruptions along this route can produce cascading economic effects. Higher transportation costs quickly
translate into inflation, eroding household purchasing power and placing
additional strain on governments already managing debt and fiscal pressure.
Clausewitz described friction as the accumulation of countless small
difficulties that together make even simple tasks extraordinarily challenging.
In today’s context, inflation, shipping delays, supply shortages and market
volatility represent precisely such accumulative pressures. Individually, each
challenge may appear manageable; collectively, they can strain economic
resilience and slow growth across the region.
Another significant vulnerability lies in Eastern Africa’s dependence on
remittances from migrant workers in the Gulf.
Hundreds of thousands of workers
from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and other countries are employed in Gulf economies
and send billions of dollars home annually. These remittances support household
consumption, education and local investment.
If the escalating confrontation
destabilises Gulf economies or disrupts labour markets, remittance flows could
decline sharply. For many families across Eastern Africa, remittances are not
merely supplemental income but a vital economic lifeline.
Compounding these risks is the already crowded geopolitical landscape of
the Horn of Africa. The region is currently grappling with multiple overlapping
crises: the civil war in Sudan, tensions surrounding Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam, Somalia’s struggle against violent extremism and growing
competition among external powers. The emerging confrontation involving the
United States, Israel and Iran risks adding another layer to this already
complex environment.
Several Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Turkey — maintain substantial political, economic and military
interests in the Horn of Africa.
Their responses to developments in the Middle
East could reshape regional alliances and influence local conflicts in ways
that remain difficult to predict. This uncertainty reflects the essence of
Clausewitz’s fog of war: leaders must make strategic decisions without full
knowledge of how competing actors will behave or how multiple crises might
intersect.
The strategic ambiguity surrounding foreign military presence in the
region further complicates the situation. The Horn of Africa hosts a
significant concentration of foreign military installations, particularly in
Djibouti, where several global powers maintain bases.
Additional security
partnerships and military arrangements are also emerging along the Red Sea
corridor. While these facilities are designed to enhance security and strategic
reach, they may also introduce new vulnerabilities during periods of heightened
geopolitical confrontation.
For Eastern African governments, the central strategic question is
therefore clear: how can the region navigate this geopolitical fog without
becoming entangled in a conflict originating far beyond its borders? The answer
lies in strategic restraint, regional cooperation and economic resilience.
Diplomatically, governments across the region must maintain careful
strategic balance. Avoiding premature alignment with competing external powers
will be essential while preserving channels of engagement with all actors.
Regional institutions such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development can play a crucial role in articulating collective
positions and coordinating responses to emerging security risks.
Security cooperation will also be vital. Enhanced intelligence sharing,
stronger maritime surveillance and coordinated counter-terrorism initiatives
can help prevent extremist groups or proxy networks from exploiting the
geopolitical turmoil.
At the same time, economic resilience must become a
central policy priority. Diversifying trade routes, strengthening regional
commerce under the African Continental Free Trade Area and safeguarding
diaspora remittance flows could help cushion the region against external
shocks.
The Horn of Africa has long been shaped by external geopolitical
rivalries. From Cold War competition to contemporary struggles among global and
regional powers, the region has frequently found itself caught between
competing interests. The escalating US-Israel-Iran confrontation risks
repeating that pattern.
Yet Clausewitz’s enduring insight remains instructive: while the fog of
war cannot be eliminated, wise leadership can navigate it through prudence,
adaptability, and strategic clarity. For Eastern African leaders, the
imperative is clear.
The region must resist being drawn into another cycle of
proxy competition and instead focus on safeguarding sovereignty, stability and
economic resilience. Navigating the fog of global geopolitics will require
discipline, foresight, and unity to ensure the region remains secure, stable
and strategically autonomous.
Dr Asembo is executive director,
the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy, a Nairobi-based think tank