While Kenyans were hooked up in the election outcome and President William Ruto’s formation of government, al Shabaab has threatened to continue with its attacks in Kenya, if the Kenyan Defense Forces continue with their mission in Somalia.
The terror group issued a statement on August 20 pointing out their propaganda on the KDF invasion of Somalia. Such propaganda is not new, and the group has used it to attract the Ummah — populace.
However, by the Muslim elites and community in Kenya have deterred such propaganda. The state has devolved action plans and security policies to fight threats and attacks. However, such policies are affected by political will — key decision makers' willingness to conduct strategic security policies.
Most importantly, the threats have a pattern, particularly every electioneering period, most of which have led to attacks months after. These threats and attacks have created different impacts in Kenya, leading to varying twists in security policies and loss of life. They also demonstrate the continued strength of the violent extremist groups.
The recent Ethiopia-Somalia cross-border attack in the Ogaden region left about 800 al Shabaab fighters dead with unknown casualties of Ethiopian soldiers. The different sporadic attacks in August in Somalia demonstrate such resilience of the terror group and the withdrawal promises of the regional peace keeping military group, African Mission in Somalia, now renamed Atmis, are untimely giving the military group an occupational status.
AL-SHABAAB’S IMPACT ON KENYA
The Somalia-based jihadist group has been threatening attacks in Kenya since the initiation of the Jubaland policy.
This policy was an agreement between the Kenyan elite within the National Security Council and their Somalia elites to create a separate state in southern Somalia. Yusuf Haji (now deceased), a former minister (Defence and Internal Security in acting capacity), and his Somalia counterpart, Mohamed Abdi alias Gandhi, who was also the Azania president, planned the Jubaland policy and trained about 3000 young soldiers to fight al Shabaab in Jubaland.
However, the policy failed due to clan politics in Somalia, and President Mwai Kibaki’s administration tried again with Ras Kambooni Brigade, Ahmed Madore, which also failed.
Some of the 3,000 trained youth in Isiolo and Manyani Kenya wildlife camp created a threat to the Kibaki administration due to some of them joining al Shabaab in Southern Somalia and making proxy wars between 2010 and 2011.
The failure of the Jubaland policy led to a military operation by the KDF coded Linda Nchi —protect the state.
The Kibaki administration announced Linda Nchi operation on October 14, 2011. However, its operation started earlier in August of the same year. With the difficulties of Linda Nchi in Somalia, KDF opted to join Amisom in February 2012.
These operations led to a potent threat by the al Shabaab social media leadership led by the Kenyan youth, Amir Ahmed Iman Ali Abu Usama, a former leader of the Muslim Youth Centre in Pumwani Nairobi.
Ahmed Iman created an online platform spreading religious propaganda and land grievances and persuading the Kenyan Ummah, particularly the youth, to shift the battleground from Somalia to Kenya. This led to several attacks in various parts of the Coast, Northeastern Kenya, and Nairobi coordinated by the Kenyan youth recruited to the terror group.
Despite the VEO being victorious over the years with their Swahili propagandists, Ahmed Iman later killed by the KDF in Somalia in 2019.
The threat after Linda Nchi led to increased sporadic attacks in Kenya, such as the Westgate siege in September 2013, Mpeketoni attacks in June 2014, Mandera massacres in November 2014, Garissa University attack in 2015, the El-Adde battle in January 2016, and another in Kulbiyow in January 2017, as well as the DusitD2 complex attack in Nairobi in January 2019.
Both the El-Adde and Kulbiyow attacks targeted KDF soldiers in Somalia. These attacks came even after al Shabaab issued threats, and the security intelligence given before the attacks.
Thus, a threat by al Shabaab on August 20 should be taken seriously because the group appears to be providing such threats and then acting months later.
POLICY SOLUTIONS
The August threat by the al Shabaab to the Kenyan state demonstrates the continued strength of the group, taking advantage of the different territories due to the limitations of Amisom despite the progress of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
Despite being part of the Amisom, Kenya’s new administration under President Ruto ought to strengthen its domestic security strategies through available devolved security policies such as Community Policing Authority.
However, this authority faced political challenges from the Executive and was replaced by the Nyumba Kumi policing initiative by President Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration.
Nyumba Kumi is a surveillance cluster from the central national security strategy to the neighbourhood watch of 10 houses, neighbours having to cooperate and help the security fraternity to monitor through community policing.
However, CPA is a much better strategy for community-oriented policing. It is a policing strategy that stipulates gaining trust from the elected civilian leaders working with the police leadership and the community to detect al Shabaab threats and attacks.
The Ruto administration acknowledged security challenges and promised security and police reforms in their manifesto. Thus, CPA is a recommended security strategy to start with.
The Jubaland policy was a reaction to the growth of al Shabaab in southern Somalia from 2010. Equally, the Nyumba Kumi policy was a muddling-through approach to react to the increased terror threats and attacks since 2013.
Therefore, if the Ruto administration applies the devolved security strategies such as CPA, which is enshrined in Article 244 of the Constitution and Section 41 of the National Police Act, the community in the regions targeted by al Shabaab will play a significant role in building trust, eliminating threats and attacks through working with the security fraternity through their elected representatives.
The author is a research fellow at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, the University of Nairobi. He is also an assistant research fellow at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. His research is based in Kenya and Somalia, focusing on community armed groups and violent extremist organizations, radicalization, countering violent extremism, and ontological security.
