Following the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its forays into Eastern Ukraine, there has been a noticeable re-awakening of Russia’s interests in Africa.
Unlike the former Soviet Union, modern day Russia is far from being equal to geopolitical rivals such as the US, China and the EU. Nevertheless, with a battered economy it has skilfully punched above its weight in many African countries asserting itself as a major global player.
Overall, Russian trade and investment in the continent is infinitesimal except in the strategic energy and mining sectors. Foreign Direct Investment Stock amounts to less than one per cent. Russia’s overall objective is building a new arena for geopolitical competition.
In the 1990s, post-Soviet turmoil ended many of Russia's global ambitions, including in Africa. However, Sochi Summit in 2019 opened a new page in the history of Russia-Africa relations. Beyond the splashy show of unity and camaraderie, the summit spawned $12.5 billion worth of business deals inked, largely in exports for arms and grains. Since then, Russia has used a range of military, economic and soft power tools to gradually rebuild its influence in Africa.
Moscow’s expansion into Africa is defined not only on economic terms; arms trading — Russia is the leading exporter of arms to Africa controlling 49 per cent of the overall arms market but also political; backing of non-democratic elected regimes like in Libya, CAR, Guinea, Sudan and Mali and important of all is the strategic reasons; to secure ports and base access to support naval operations in the Horn of Africa, Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
African seaports and air bases will help Russia project its international military power and, in the future, could affect North Atlantic Alliance force deployments in times of crisis, while at the same time establishing herself as a powerbroker in a region bordering NATO’s southern flank and international shipping chokeholds.
Moscow’s low-cost ventures in Africa, coopting political leaders and accessing resources in the long run will have profound impact on the politics, sovereignty, and stability of the continent.Since 2015, trade between Russia and African countries has doubled to about $20 billion a year. Of importance is that, apart from oil and grains, Russia’s other exports to Africa has been mercenaries (Wagner Group), arms and campaign disinformation through asymmetric tactics adding further strains to already fragile political systems.
Russia has been making deals with several African countries to have access to its airbases and seaports. Particular attention has been given to ports strategically located in Berbera (Somaliland), Massawa and Assab (Eritrea), Port Sudan (Sudan), and various facilities in Eastern Libya. Russia has also explored port access in southern Africa particularly with Mozambique and South Africa.
On the eve of the Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Kenya’s Ambassador to the United Nations Martin Kimani made a remarkable speech that was lauded for its support of a rules-based international order. Of the 54 African countries, 28 backed the motion, 17 abstained, eight were no shows. Only Eritrea joined Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Syria in voting against.
In the past, Russia has used its UN Security Council veto power to aligned itself with whichever player suits its interests. In as much, African voting behaviour demonstrated that African relations with Russia will not be uniform nor will it abruptly be reversed as it is mainly about self-interest not ideology.
The UN vote has revealed Africa’s diverging and widening segmentation on democratic views on governance norms. It has also been a useful prism to understand relationships between Moscow and Africa. As much as Russia sees Africa as key to its goal of a more multipolar world, if the voting pattern is anything to go by, moving forward, African countries will be expected to engage with Russia differently.
Drawing from its Syria’s playbook, Russia’s strategy in Africa is both opportunistic and calculating. It is opportunistic in that it is willing to take risks – propped up proxies in Libya, Sudan, Guinea, CAR and Mali. In these countries Africa’s sovereign interests have given way to Russian priorities.
It is calculating in that it aims to expand Russia’s power projection; its interventions in Eastern Libya through strategic chokeholds in the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal.
The economic sanctions are designed to hurt and isolate Russia. Not forgetting that this will have adverse impact not only with oil, wheat and other grain price hikes, but also a beleaguered Russia pursuing an aggressive policy in Africa that will be highly transactional, calculative and opportunistic in order to gain new allies, markets and raw materials.
Africa should brace itself for challenging years ahead.
Asaaska Labarakwe is a public policy analyst – [email protected]
