If democracy is so good, why are francophone West African states rejecting it for military coups? The irony of the recent coup in Niger epitomises francophone West Africa’s affinity for military rule over democracy.
In numerous states across the Sahel region, including Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, popular nationalism has trampled democracy in favour of militaristic autocracy.
The recent coup d’état in Niger also cemented an alarming trend in francophone West Africa. A democratic backsliding cemented by military regimes rejecting their subordination to democratic civilian authority.
In addition to this, militaristic autocracies appear to be coalescing to protect each other as the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso warned the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) against any attempted military intervention to restore the democratically elected government of Mohamed Bazoum in Niger.
Why are francophone West African countries rejecting democracy for military coups? One reason is that liberal democracy, as understood in the shape of democratic government, regular, free and fair elections and popular sovereignty, has failed to meet the most basic needs of the populations in those countries. These basic needs include security, food, water, basic infrastructure and accountable government.
Secondly, popular nationalism has rejected the decades-old neocolonial domination of the region by France in economic, security and political spaces. In the case of Niger, for instance, hurriedly granted 'independence' from France only led to five military coups since the independence of that country in 1960.
The French maintained a lock on the Nigerien uranium economy, constrained its economy via the CFA franc domiciled in Paris and perpetuated an extractive neocolonial state buttressed and maintained by the France Rapid Reaction Forces to keep unpopular governments in power over many decades since independence.
This has led to a rise in anti-French sentiment in Niger and the possibility of the country moving closer to Russia.
Thirdly, tied to anti-French sentiment is the deteriorating security and economic situation in many francophone West African nations since the collapse of the central government in Libya and the proliferation of jihadist separatist groups in Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso.
In the Guinean context, the deteriorating economic situation in the country and the illiberal democratic behaviour of former president Lansana Conte in perpetuating himself in power, only strengthened the military’s hand and led to the inevitable military takeover of that country.
What is the future of democracy in francophone West Africa? Not good! Weak political institutions and existentialist threats to the state across the Sahel region will only entrench the military and legitimise their raison d’etre to remain in office against democratic norms that subject the generals to civilian authority.
In addition to this, the ineffective capacity of democratically elected governments in countries like Niger to address immediate security, economic and political problems provides a power vacuum for the military to fill.
Russia seems to be the alternative to France in the region. The perception that an anti-colonial Russia can provide security and prop up authoritarian rulers in the region without the troublesome Western lead requirements for democratic norms and human rights, make militaristic governments an attractive option in a very unstable region.
Lastly, military intervention from ECOWAS can only reinforce nationalistic sentiment, exacerbate anti-French anger and get a coalition of regional states with their own vested interests in francophone West Africa embroiled in intra-state conflict in each of these Sahelian francophone West African states.
In the marketplace of options for this region, democracy isn’t the only product for sale. For now, military coups appear to be paying better dividends.
