The debate on whether to have manual backup for the IEBC’s electronic register is a red herring in my view. The real issue should be whether the multi-billion shilling IEBC's electronic systems are up to task, and whether we got value for money.
In my opinion, the electronic systems are cosmetic and redundant, and do not in any way help avoid rigging. They are designed to catch the small fish not the real election thieves.
It is an undeniable fact that the BVR kits are fool proof in identifying an individual because unlike keys or cards, which can be transferred to different people, biometric readers use unique human features such as fingerprints.
You therefore cannot impersonate anybody. Second, one must be physically present at the point of identification. Such systems only work where human intervention or influence is eliminated unlike in our electoral system, which is by and large manual.
As you may be aware, the IEBC has three electronic systems which relate to the management of elections. Biometric voter registration, electronic voter identification and the result transmission and presentation system.
BVR and EVID, which use biometric technology, have been falsely touted as the cure to the age-old problem of election rigging in this country. However, a deeper analysis of these systems exposes them as functionally useless and a waste of public resources. They hardly prevent rigging.
For starters, the costly BVR system used for registering voters comprises a laptop, a fingerprint scanner and a camera. It only catches the lone wolf trying to register more than once.
While it’s important to prevent overvoting, it’s a statistically insignificant problem and there are much cheaper ways of doing that. First, no database can allow one ID number to be used for more than one registration. Second, it’s highly unlikely that the National Registration Bureau has issued any individual with two different ID numbers.
Double registration is not where elections are stolen, especially here. Elections are stolen by compromised election officials, who manipulate voter statistics to allow for fiddling of results.
For example, at the end of each voter registration, the IEBC releases results for polling stations, wards, constituencies, counties and the national level.
However, we hardly ever have the opportunity to interrogate the accuracy of these numbers. That's where the problem lies. What if instead of the 675 voters we are told are in a polling station, only 450 are actually there?
What if some crooked character at the IEBC has inflated the numbers to allow for vote stuffing on Election Day? How sure can we be that there are 14 million voters as announced by the IEBC and not 11 million?
Unless political parties and other interested players audit and verify for themselves the numbers released by the IEBC, the BVR system has so far done very little in improving the accuracy and integrity of the voters’ register.
The second electronic system used by IEBC is the EVID. This is how it works. Some time before Election Day, data from the BVR machines is transferred to the EVID. When you go to vote, the device compares your fingerprints, or any other biometric data in the database, to confirm if you are the one who registered.
In theory, the EVIDs ensure that only those duly registered are allowed to vote. But does it really do that? You can actually still vote even if you are not registered. All you need is for the polling official to give you a ballot paper.
You see, in real biometric access control systems, the human role in authentication and authorisation of an individual to access a restricted service or area is removed. The machine or device just compares your biometric data to what is already in the database, and automatically decides whether you should access the service.
The system then automatically allows you access by electronically causing the door to open, for example. No security guard manually opens the door for you.
However, in the IEBC’s system, the EVID is just a decoration. All the authorisation to vote is done by a polling official, who issues you with a ballot paper. He or she may choose to ignore the EVID.
This is how it happens. When you enter the polling room, you produce your ID card and a polling clerk cross checks from a physical register if you are registered. If yes, you then go through the EVID. If you are positively identified, a polling clerk issues you with the ballot paper. That’s a real problem.
There is no way the device controls how many ballot papers the clerk gives you, neither does it stop a crooked clerk from issuing the ballot paper to an unauthorized person. I know of an incident in Uhuru Gardens Primary School polling station where an acquaintance of mine was given 5 ballot papers for the presidential election. Luckily he refused to take the extra ones.
The EVID would only be useful if it is connected to an electronic ballot dispenser, which would automatically release a ballot paper once the EVID positively identified a voter.
The other way is to then configure the EVID to also act as attendance register so that it counts and records the number of people who have voted and then automatically transmit the same info to a national tallying centre.
As presently designed, there is no way of auditing and reconciling the figures on the EVID, the number of ballots issued and the total votes cast. Only 450 people may go through the EVID but we end up with 600 votes in the ballot box.Therefore, the current debate should focus on whether the IEBC’s electronic systems are actually useful in managing and delivering a free and fair election.